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We examine empirically the direct and indirect effects of natural resource abundance on economic
growth. Natural resources have a negative impact on growth if considered in isolation, but a positive
direct impact on growth if other explanatory variables, such as corruption, investment, openness,
terms of trade, and schooling, are included. We study the transmission channels, that is, the effect
of natural resources on the other explanatory variables, and calculate the indirect effect of natural
resources on growth for each transmission channel. The negative indirect effects of natural resources
on growth are shown to outweigh the positive direct effect by a reasonable order of magnitude.
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1. Introduction
Despite the potentially beneﬁcial impact of natural resource wealth on economic
prosperity, natural-resource abundant economies tend to grow at a slower pace (Sachs
and Warner, 1995, 1997, 1999a; Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999; Leite and Weidmann,
1999; Gylfason, 2000, 2001a). Over the last two centuries, countries rich in natural
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resources, e.g., Russia, Nigeria and Venezuela, experienced growth of comparatively
low or mediocre magnitude. Sachs and Warner (1995) claim that this is a historically
common pattern. Countries that base their economies on natural resources tend to be
examples of development failures. In contrast, countries that had only limited access
to natural resources, such as Japan, Hong-Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Switzerland,
experienced remarkably high economic growth rates. Using growth regressions, we study
the transmission channels through which natural resource abundance affects growth
negatively. We investigate the effect of natural resources on corruption, investment, trade,
schooling and then, indirectly, on economic growth.
Many development economists, e.g., Nurkse (1953) and Rostow (1960), accentuate
the positive role of natural resources in economic development. To many economists
the tendency of natural resource-rich countries to experience low economic growth is
a conceptual puzzle. Economists consider natural resources to be a potential source of
income, some of which is saved and converted into capital to support increases in future
output levels. For example, resource rents may be used for the construction of roads,
modernization of telecommunication systems, health and educational programs. Several
countries did beneﬁt from their natural wealth; the nineteenth century resource booms
in Latin America stimulated economic progress. For example, Ecuador experienced a
signiﬁcantly higher income per-capita level after its boom (Sachs and Warner, 1999a).
Similarly,theindustrialrevolutioninGreatBritainandGermanywaspossibleonlybecause
of the vast deposits of ore and coal (Sachs and Warner, 1995). As a more recent example,
Norway manages its natural-resource abundance well and converts it into economic
prosperity. Although Norway did experience a recession for several years, the way in
which its present and future natural wealth is exploited provides an example of carefully
planneddevelopment.Almost 80%of the oil rents are collected throughtaxes and fees and
then invested in foreign securities to protect the economy from abrupt and large income
increases so that a fair division of oil rents between generations is achieved (Gylfason,
2001a).
Given the relatively few successful examples, this paper investigates the causes for
under-performance by most resource-rich countries. In the literature, several negative
transmissionchannelshavebeeninvestigated.At a naturalresourcediscovery,the resulting
suddenincreaseinincomemayleadtoslothandlessneedforsoundeconomicmanagement
and for institutional quality (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gylfason, 2000, 2001a).T h e
boom may also create a false sense of security and weaken the perceived need for
investment and growth-promotingstrategies. Natural resource abundant economies beneﬁt
less from the technology spillovers that are typical in manufacturing industries because
the exports of these industries are harmed by an appreciation of the local currency, e.g.,
through the inﬂationary pressure resulting from increased domestic demand (Sachs and
Warner, 1995, 1999a; Gillis et al., 1996; Gylfason, 2000, 2001b). Finally, as the natural
resource sector expandsrelative to other sectors, the returns to human capital decrease and
investments in education decline (Gylfason, 2001a).
Our analysis follows the methodology set in by Mo (2000, 2001), who investigates the
transmission channels through which income inequality and corruption affect growth. We
use cross-country regressions to show that, on average, natural resources are associated
with these phenomena that impede the economic process. Taking account of the relationARTICLE IN PRESS
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between natural resources and other indices used for growth regressions, we highlight
the curse of natural resources. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that, if the negative indirect effects
are excluded, natural resources contribute positively to economic growth. However, if the
negative indirect impacts are included, these outweigh the positive direct contribution of
natural resources to economic growth. We emphasize that this is an empirical ﬁnding and
not an economic theory.If the governmentwere to succeed in preventingthe occurrenceof
these indirect phenomena, the country would beneﬁt from its natural wealth.
The next section is devoted to the basic growth regressions. We verify that, in general,
natural resource abundance impedes economic development rather than stimulates it.
However,we also ﬁnd that, if other indicessuch as corruption,investment,openness,terms
oftrade,andschoolingaretakenintoaccountasindependentvariables,resourceabundance
has a positive direct impact on growth. Section 3 studies empirically the transmission
channels and compares their relative weights in the overall negative impact of natural
resources on economic growth. Section 4 concludes with a policy discussion on how to
avoid the resource curse.
2. Basic cross-country regressions
To identifythe dependenceof growthonnaturalresourceabundance,we estimate cross-
countrygrowthregressionsfollowingtheempiricalworkofKormendiandMeguire(1985),
Grier and Tullock (1989), Barro (1991) and Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997). We base our
equations on the conditional convergence hypothesis, i.e., different growth rates between
different countries are explained by various characteristics of these countries; however,
high-incomecountries have lower growth rates than low-income countries, all other things




0. It also depends
onnaturalresourceabundanceRi,andonavectorofotherexplanatoryvariablesZi.Hence,
we have:






where i corresponds to each country in the sample. Our focus is on the sign of the
coefﬁcient for resource abundance, α2, and its relation to the vector of other variables Z.
The long-term income effects of a change in a country’s resource income can
be described by changes in the current value of resource abundance and the other
characteristics in Eq. (1). We denote these permanent changes by  R and  Z in Eq. (1).
As we show in Appendix A, a permanent difference in R or Z has a long-term effect on





=− (α2/α1) R −(α3/α1) Z,
where  ln(Y∞) = ln(Y∞)j −ln(Y∞)i.
Taking exponentials, we can rewrite Eq. (2) and calculate the relative long-term income
effect as
(3) E( Y∞/Y∞) = exp
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For small values of (α2/α1) R and (α3/α1) Z, we can use the following approximation:
(4) E( Y∞/Y∞) ≈− (α2/α1) R −(α3/α1) Z.
The ratio −(α2/α1) captures the long-term income effect of changes in resource
endowments. Similarly, the ratio −(α3/α1) captures the long-term impact of changes in
other explanatoryvariables. Assuming conditional convergence,i.e., α1 < 0, four different
situations may arise. A ratio −(α2/α1) = 1 indicates that an immediate 1% increase in
currentincomebasedonnaturalresourceexploitation,i.e., R = 0.01,alsoraisesthelong-
term income level by 1%, i.e.,  Y∞/Y∞ = 0.01. If −(α2/α1)>1, resource abundance is
so beneﬁcial to growth that a 1% increase in current resource income raises long-term
income by more than 1%. On the other hand, if −(α2/α1)<1, a 1% increase in resource
income results in less than a 1% raise in long-term income. In the later situation, the
economybeneﬁts fromresource expansionbut the permanentincome effect is smaller than
the temporary resource income effect. Finally, if α2 < 0a n dα1 < 0, resource expansion
leadsto onlya short-livedincreasein incomebecausegrowthis affectednegatively.Hence,
in the long term, the levelof permanentincomeis actually less than it would be withoutthe
increase in natural resources. This correspondsto a situation known as the curse of natural
resources.
We estimate growth Eq. (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS)1 and increase gradually
the set of variables Zi. Appendix B lists the variables and the data sources. As a starting
point, we include only initial income per capita in year 1975 (LnY75) and natural resource
abundance, for which we take the share of mineral production in GDP in 1971 (SNR) as
a proxy. The results, presented in column (1) of Table 1, indicate a highly signiﬁcant and
negative relationship between economic growth and natural resources. A one-percentage
point increase in income from mineral resources relative to total income decreases growth
by 0.075% per year. An increase in income from mineral resources of one standard
deviation (0.07), decreases the growth rate by about 0.5% per year. Hence, natural
resources appear to be an impediment to economic growth.
In the next regression, we include a measure of corruption for the 1980 to 1985 period
from Transparency International. Higher values of the index correspond both to higher
levels of corruptionand to lower levels of institutional quality and the period is the earliest
for which the index is available. In our regressions, we try to choose variables that refer
either to the beginning of the overall period or to average values for the entire period to
avoid endogeneityproblemsthat may arise between variables. However,Mo (2001)argues
that endogeneityis lesslikely forthe corruptionvariablebecauseinstitutionstendto evolve
slowly. The second regression in column (2) shows a negative sign for the coefﬁcient α1,
which supports the conditional convergence hypothesis. Furthermore, corruption affects
1 Alternatively, the method of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) can be used to estimate simultaneously
the basic cross-country regression, given by Eq. (1), and the indirect transmission channels, given by Eq. (5) in
the following section, as a system of equations. The speciﬁcation of our system of equations allows us to use
OLS because the OLS and SUR estimates coincide in this system. Incorporating all transmission channels into
the basic growth regression and allowing all indirect transmission channels to have identical explanatory variables
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Growth regressions as in Eq. (1)
Dependent variable: G75–96 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant −2.62 10.03 11.66 12.87 12.33 12.03
LnY75 0.52** −1.16*** −1.61*** −1.77*** −1.76*** −1.61***
(0.89) (2.48)( −3.00)( −4.93)( −5.55)( −5.98)( −3.91)
SNR −7.57*** −7.39** −4.41 −3.11 0.93 1.59
(0.07) (−4.09)( −2.04)( −1.47)( −1.07)( 0.32)( 0.59)
Corruption −0.44*** −0.30** −0.26** −0.19* −0.09
(2.68) (−3.06)( −2.52)( −2.25)( −1.76)( −0.86)
Investments 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.16***
(8.06) (4.82)( 4.15)( 5.07)( 5.56)
Openness 1.26** 1.64*** 1.26**
(0.45) (2.31)( 3.23)( 2.39)




R2 adjusted 0.18 0.25 0.51 0.55 0.62 0.66
N 103 47 47 47 46 39
Notes: 1. The standard deviations for the independent variables are in parentheses, based on the sample of 39 core
countries used in the regression in column (6). 2. The t-statistics for the coefﬁcients are in parentheses.
* 10% level of signiﬁcance.
** 5% level of signiﬁcance.
*** 1% level of signiﬁcance.
economic growth negatively, as expected. An increase in the corruption level of one
standard deviation decreases growth by 1.17%, which is 2.68 multiplied by 0.44. In the
long term, this leads to a permanent income decrease of 74%,2 indicating that corruption
impedes growth considerably. The coefﬁcient for natural resources is almost unaffected,
although its signiﬁcance is reduced substantially. An increase in natural resource income
of 1% of total income decreases growth by 0.07% per year and reduces long-term total
income by about 6.4% from Eq. (4). This regression illustrates the point that, although
natural resources increase wealth in the short term, the economy loses more in long-term
growth than it gains in the short run.
In the subsequent columns of the table, we include as independent variables the ratio
of real gross domestic investment to real GDP averaged over the period from 1975 to
1996, an index of openness, measured by the percentage of years during the period
1970 to 1990 in which the country is considered to be an open economy by Sachs and
Warner (1995), a terms of trade index measuring the average annual growth over the
period from 1970 to 1990 in the ratio of the export price index divided by the import
price index, and a schooling index proposed by King and Levine (1993), measuring the
log of the average number of years of secondary schooling from 1970 to 1989, as a
proxy for educational quality. As we include more explanatory variables, the coefﬁcient
on natural resources decreases gradually and becomes less signiﬁcant in columns (3)
2 This change is calculated as exp(−1.17/1.16) −1 =−0.74.UNCORRECTED PROOF
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and (4). In columns (5) and (6), it becomes positive but has a low level of signiﬁcance.
Consequently, natural resources may not be harmful to growth per se. The ﬁnal regression
indicates the effects of natural resources, corruption, investment, trade policies, terms of
trade, and schooling on economic growth. Hence, the indirect effects of all transmission
channels are taken into account by the coefﬁcients of these variables. The coefﬁcient on
natural resources measures the direct effect on growth; excluding the indirect effects,
we ﬁnd an almost one-to-one relation between natural resource income and long-term
income, from the ratio of their coefﬁcients. Therefore, an increase in resource income is
permanent,althoughthe low signiﬁcanceof the direct effectof natural resourceson growth
suggests a cautious interpretation. Nonetheless, since resource-abundancedoes not have a
signiﬁcantly negative direct effect on economic development, the indirect effects must be
responsible for the overall harmful impact of natural resources on economic growth. We
investigate the transmission channels for the indirect effects in the next section.
The coefﬁcient for corruption also decreases as more explanatory variables are added
but it remainsnegative,althougheventuallyinsigniﬁcant.Mo (2001)shows that corruption
affects growth negatively through several indirect channels and that the corruption
coefﬁcient loses signiﬁcance as these channels are included in the regression. However,
corruptionhasno direct positiveeffect on income,because its coefﬁcient remainsnegative.
Furthermore, the coefﬁcients for investment, openness, terms of trade, and schooling do
not vary much. Their signs accord with intuition and are similar in value to those found
in the literature. An economy characterized by a high investment ratio, a higher openness
index, a lower initial income per capita, a decrease in terms of trade, and high educational
standards is expected to experience a relatively high growth rate (Sachs and Warner,
1995, 1997, 1999b; Sala-I-Martin, 1997; Mo, 2001). Finally, we run a series of growth
regressionsequivalentto those in Table 1 using onlythe 39 countriesthat appearin column
(6) and ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients do not change qualitatively nor do they change in an
appreciable quantitative manner. Appendix C provides a list of the 47 countries included
in columns (2) to (4) of Table 1 and the ones excluded to constitute the core sample of 39
countries of the last regression.
3. The transmission channels
To analyze the magnitude and relative importance of the transmission channels, we
estimate the effect of naturalresourceson corruption,investment,openness,termsof trade,
and schooling to capture their indirect effects on economic growth. First, we estimate the
dependence of these variables on resource income from the following:
(5) Zi = β0 +β1Ri +µi,
whereZi, β0, β1,a n dµi arevectorsofwhicheachelementisassociatedwith theindicesof
corruption, investment, openness, terms of trade, and schooling. To avoid having different
sample sizes due to data availability, we conﬁne the transmission analysis to only the 39
countries used in the last regression of Table 1.A sTable 2 indicates, these coefﬁcients are
nothighlysigniﬁcantduetosmallsamplesize.Runningthesameregressionsforthelargest
possible sample available for each transmission channel yields signiﬁcant coefﬁcients atARTICLE IN PRESS
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Corruption Investments Openness Terms of trade Schooling
Constant 5.87 20.77 0.68 −0.74 −0.70
SNR 7.21 −28.83 −1.82* 7.75* −2.16
(0.07) (1.13)( −1.52)( −1.74)( 1.75)( −1.50)
R2 adjusted 0.007 0.034 0.051 0.052 0.032
N 39 39 39 39 39
Note:1 .T h et-statistics for the coefﬁcients are in parentheses.
* 10% level of signiﬁcance.
the 1% level for the terms of trade and openness indices and at the 5% level for the
investmentandschoolingindices.The signiﬁcanceofthe corruptionchannelalso improves
although it remains the weakest channel and its index is signiﬁcant at only the 16% level.
Additionally, taking the larger samples increases the R2 for each transmission channel and
the values of the coefﬁcients are robust against the sample size.
Since natural resources explain part of the variation in investment and other variables,
we compute the direct and indirect effects of natural resources on growth. Substituting
Eq. (5) into Eq. (1) yields:





+(α2 +α3β1)Ri +α3µi +εi,
where α2Ri is the direct effect of natural resourceson growth, α3β1Ri is the indirect effect
of natural resources on growth, and µi are the residuals of Eq. (5). The estimated values
for the coefﬁcients α1, α2 + α3β1,a n dα3 of Eq. (6) are listed in Table 3. The coefﬁcient
of natural resources includes both direct and indirect effects. A 1% increase in natural
resource income leads to a decrease in the growth rate of 0.096%, and a decrease in long-
term income of about 6% from Eq. (4), which is consistent with column (2) of Table 1.3
An increase in the share of mineral production in GDP of one standard deviation would
directly and indirectly lead to a reduction in annual per-capita growth of 0.67%, which is
equal to 0.07 times −9.60, and a long-term income decrease of 33% from Eq. (3).
In addition, we can estimate the relative importance of each transmission channel
in explaining the indirect negative impact of natural resources on economic growth.
The results are presented in Table 4. The effect of natural resources on corruption is
depicted in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.4 Natural resources tend to increase the level of
corruption, but the indirect effect on growth is relatively small compared to the other
transmission channels, at 6%. This ﬁnding is consistent with recent empirical work by
Sachsand Warner(1995)and Gylfason(2000).Althoughthe contributionof the corruption
channel to the indirect negative impact of natural resources seems minor, it does have a
3 However, this regression in Table 1 is based on a larger sample.
4 An extensive literature considers the endogeneity of social capital and institutions and concludes that
institutions are not affected by other factors in the short run, but they are in the long term. We link institutional
quality to natural resource abundance. Acemoglu et al. (2001), Mauro (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999) relate
institutions to the mortality rate of settlers during colonization, ethnolinguistic fragmentation, and geographical
characteristics, respectively.ARTICLE IN PRESS
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Growth regression, including indirect effects


















Notes: 1. The standard deviations for the independent variables are in
parentheses. 2. The t-statistics for the coefﬁcients are in parentheses.
** 5% level of signiﬁcance.
*** 1% level of signiﬁcance.
Table 4
Relative importance of transmission channels
Transmission channels α3 β1 Contribution to α3β1 Relative contribution
(Table 1)( Table 2)
Corruption −0.09 7.21 −0.65 6%
Investment 0.16 −28.83 −4.61 41%
Openness 1.26 −1.82 −2.29 21%
Terms of trade −0.31 7.75 −2.40 21%
Schooling 0.58 −2.16 −1.25 11%
Total −11.2 100%
signiﬁcant consequence, since it alone cancels out about 40% of the positive direct effect
of natural resources on economic growth, which is 0.65 from Table 4 divided by 1.59
from Table 1. Explanations of the effect of natural resources on institutional quality and,
more speciﬁcally on corruption, are found in the literature. Krueger (1974) argues that
natural resources provide rents, so that they promote rent-seeking competition rather than
productive activities. Moreover, rents induce economic agents to bribe the administration
in order to gain access to them (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gray and Kaufmann, 1998;
Ascher, 1999; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999; Gylfason, 2001a;
Torvik, 2002). Furthermore, Mauro (1998) claims that natural resource abundance is often
associated with the emergence of politically powerful interest groups that attempt to
inﬂuence politicians to adopt policies that may not favor the general public interest.ARTICLE IN PRESS
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The second transmission channel, investment, is the most important as it accounts
for 41% of the indirect negative impact of natural resources on growth. Gylfason and
Zoega (2001) argue that natural resource wealth decreases the need for savings and
investment, because natural resources provide a continuous stream of future wealth that
is less dependent on the transfer of man-made capital to future periods. However, world
prices tend to be more volatile for primary commodities than for other goods. Therefore,
an economy based on primary production will ﬂuctuate from booms to recessions, which
creates uncertainty for investors in these natural resource economies (Sachs and Warner,
1999b).Additionally,duringa natural resource boom,increased rentsin the primarysector
cause a reallocation of factors of production from manufacturing towards the booming
primary sector. Since the manufacturing sector is often characterized by increasing returns
to scale and positive externalities, a decrease in scale of manufacturing decreases the
productivity and proﬁtability of investment, which accelerates further the decrease in
investment (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999a; Gillis et al., 1996; Gylfason, 2000, 2001a).
Finally, Gylfason and Zoega (2001) conclude that the rate of optimal savings and the
maturity of the ﬁnancial system is negatively related to the share of natural resources in
national output.
The international transmission channel consists of the effects of natural resources on
the degree of openness of the economy and its terms of trade. Taken together these two
channels account for another 42% of the negative indirect impact of natural resources
on growth. Natural resource abundance reduces openness and has negative effects on
the terms of trade. Since natural resources weaken the manufacturing sector, policy
makers may impose import quotas and tariffs that, in the short run, protect domestic
producers(Auty, 1994; Sachs and Warner, 1995).However, in the long run, such measures
reduce the openness of the economy and retard its integration into the global economy.
In addition, natural resource booms increase domestic income and, consequently, the
demand for goods, which generates inﬂation and an overvaluation of the domestic
currency. Hence, the relative prices of all non-traded goods increase and the terms of
trade deteriorate, so that exports become expensive relative to world market prices and
decline. This phenomenon is known as the Dutch Disease (Sachs and Warner, 1995;
Torvik, 2001; Gylfason, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999).
Finally, the schooling transmission channel is almost twice as important as the
corruption channel. Natural resource booms lead to a decline in the manufacturing sector
forwhichhumancapitalisan importantproductionfactor.Hence,Gylfason(2001a)argues
that the need for high-quality education declines and, with it, the returns to education.
Sachs and Warner (1995) claim that natural resource abundance creates a false sense of
conﬁdence and that easy riches lead to sloth. An expanding primary sector does not need
a high-skilled labor force, so that spending on education need not increase. Hence, the
future expansion of other sectors that require educational quality is restricted (Gylfason,
2000, 2001a, 2001b; Sachs and Warner, 1999b) and technological diffusion is retarded
(Nelson and Phelps, 1966). Our result that schooling is a more important and more
signiﬁcant transmission channel than corruption contrasts with the empirical results in
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999a).ARTICLE IN PRESS
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Duringthe past decades,the paradoxofa negativeimpactofnaturalresourceabundance
on economic growth has been widely observed. Many countries rich in oil reserves, gas,
or tropical forests used for timber production experienced disappointing growth levels. In
contrast, many resource-poor countries experienced strong growth. However, exceptions
to this phenomenon can be found. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, iron and
coal reserves were the stimulus for the industrial revolution and growth. In the twentieth
century, resource abundant countries such as Norway and Iceland experienced remarkable
and sustained growth rates. Hence, natural resource wealth may stimulate growth but only
under certain conditions. A natural resource economy that suffers from corruption, low
investment, protectionist measures, a deteriorating terms of trade, and low educational
standards will probably not beneﬁt from its natural wealth due to adverse indirect effects.
Our empirical analysis indicates that natural resource wealth increases growth, if
negative indirect effects are excluded. However, if these transmission channels are
included, the overall effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth is strongly
negative. Moreover, the investment channel is shown to be the most important of these
transmission channels. Extensions of this analysis can expand the sample used for the
empirical analysis and identify additional transmission channels through which natural
resourcesaffect growth. In addition, the mechanismsbehind the transmission channelscan
be investigated more thoroughly. A better understanding of these mechanisms is essential
for developing policy measures to reduce the negative impact of natural resources on
economic growth.
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Appendix A. Long-term income effects
Inthisappendix,we derivethelong-termincomeeffectsofEq.(2),usingthedescription
of economic growth in Eq. (1).S i n c eGi represents income growth in country i over a
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We use this equation to calculate the difference in expected income from changes in R
and Z. Since the level of initial incomehas not changed,we abstract from anyconvergence
impacts on long-termgrowth ( ln(Y0) = ln(Y
j
0 )−ln(Yi
0) = 0). This allows us to focus on
income differences generated either by the resource-abundance factor or the vector of the





= α2T R+α3T Z,
where  ln(Yt) = ln(Y
j
t )−ln(Yi
t ). To assess the long-term effects of R and Z on income,
we assume that  R and  Z are constant over time and study the propagation of income





= (α1T +2)(α2T R+α3T Z).









Since 0 <α 1T +1< 1, as t goes to inﬁnity, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side reduces to








Hence, Eq. (2) is derived.
Appendix B. List of variables
G: Average annual growth in real GDP per person from 1975 to 1996, calculated as
G = (ln(Y1996/Y1975)/21)×100%.Source:CenterforInternationalComparisons
at the University of Pennsylvania (CIC), 2002.
LnY75: The log of real GDP per capita in 1975 at 1985 international prices. Source:
Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CIC),
2002.
SNR: TheshareofmineralproductioninGDPfor1971.Source:CenterforInternational
Development at Harvard University (CID), 2002.
Corruption: The Corruption Perception Index from 1980 to 1985 from Transparency
International. The index means the degree to which corruption is perceived to
exist among public ofﬁcials and politicians. Source: Center for Globalization and
Europeanization of the Economy (CeGE), 2002 of the Georg-August-University
of Goettingen and Transparency International Organization (TI), 2002.
Investment: Average real gross domestic investment, private and public, at 1985 interna-
tional prices, from 1975 to 1996. Source: Center for InternationalComparisonsat
the University of Pennsylvania (CIC), 2002.
Openness: The fraction of years from 1965 to 1990 in which the country is rated as an
open economy according to the criteria imposed by Sachs and Warner. Source:
Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID), 2002.ARTICLE IN PRESS
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Terms of trade: The average annual growth in the log of external terms of trade between
1970 and 1990, where the terms of trade is given by the ratio of an export price
index to an import price index. Source: Center for International Development at
Harvard University (CID), 2002.
Schooling: The log of average secondary schooling from 1970 to 1989, known as the
King and Levine Index. Source: Center for International Development at Harvard
University (CID), 2002.
Appendix C. List of countries in samples
1. Argentina* 11. China* 21. Ireland 31. Nigeria* 41. Taiwan*
2. Australia 12. Colombia 22. Israel 32. Norway 42. Thailand
3. Austria 13. Denmark 23. Italy 33. Pakistan 43. Turkey
4. Bangladesh* 14. Ecuador 24. Japan 34. Philippines 44. Uganda
5. Belgium 15. Egypt 25. Jordan* 35. Portugal 45. United Kingdom
6. Bolivia 16. Finland 26. Kenya 36. Singapore 46. United States*
7. Brazil 17. France 27. Malaysia 37. South Africa 47. Venezuela
8. Cameroon 18. Greece 28. Mexico 38. Spain
9. Canada 19. Hong Kong 29. Netherlands 39. Sweden
10. Chile 20. India 30. New Zealand 40. Switzerland*
* Countries excluded in sample used for regressions (2)–(4).
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